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Abstract 
We estimate the impulse response of key US macro series to the monetary policy shocks 
identified by Romer and Romer (2004), allowing the response to depend flexibly on the state 
of the business cycle. We find strong evidence that the effects of monetary policy on real and 
nominal variables are more powerful in expansions than in recessions. The magnitude of the 
difference is particularly large in durables expenditure and business investment. The effect is 
not attributable to differences in the response of fiscal variables or the external finance 
premium. We find some evidence that contractionary policy shocks have more powerful 
effects than expansionary shocks. But contractionary shocks have not been more common in 
booms, so this asymmetry cannot explain our main finding. 
 
JEL Classifications:  E52, E32 
Keywords:  asymmetric effects of monetary policy, transmission mechanism, recession, 
durable goods, local projection methods 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Tenreyro acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council under the 
European Community's ERC starting grant agreement 240852 Research on Economic 
Fluctuations and Globalization. We thank Olivier Coibion for providing his data. 
 Silvana Tenreyro is a Research Associate at the Centre for Economic Performance 
and Professor of Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science. Gregory 
Thwaites is a PhD Research Student with the Department of Economics, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
 S. Tenreyro and G. Thwaites , submitted 2013 
1 Introduction
Is monetary policy more powerful in expansions or in recessions? A priori, the
answer is unclear. Expenditure could be more or less sensitive to real interest rates
at different points in the business cycle. Imperfections in the financial system might
magnify or dampen the transmission of policy at different times. Prices might be
more or less sticky. And the systematic component of monetary policy itself might
behave differently. Previous work has addressed this question, and adjacent ones,
both theoretically and empirically. The results have been mixed.
We investigate this question anew on US data, and find strong evidence that
monetary policy shocks typically have much more powerful effects on output and
inflation in an expansion than in a recession. We follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2011) in adapting the local projection method of Jorda` (2005) with the smooth
transition regression method of Granger and Terasvirta (1994), to allow impulse
response functions to depend on the state of the business cycle. We investigate the
state-dependence of monetary policy impulse response functions in this framework,
examining the response of a range of real and nominal variables to the estimate of
monetary policy shocks introduced by Romer and Romer (2004).
The main result from our investigation is that shocks to the federal funds rate are
more powerful in expansions than in recessions.1 Nearly all of the effect we observe
on average in the data is attributable to the effect in good times, and in particular
to the response of durable consumption and business and household investment. In
an expansion, output and then inflation fall in response to a negative monetary
shock in the textbook fashion. Within this, and in line with previous findings,
business investment and consumer expenditure on durable goods and housing are an
order of magnitude more sensitive than other expenditures, whereas the responses of
durables and nondurables prices are much closer together. In a recession, in contrast,
the response of output and inflation to monetary policy interventions is negligible.
These differences are not attributable to differences in the amplification afforded by
1Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) find that fiscal policy is instead more powerful in recessions
than in expansions; we find the opposite for monetary policy.
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the response of credit prices or quantities, nor any systematic differences in fiscal
policy across regimes. We find that contractionary shocks are more powerful than
expansionary shocks, but given that they are equally common in both expansions
and recessions, this cannot be the source of asymmetry across the business cycle.
These findings have important implications for theories of the business cycle, price
setting and monetary policy transmission, and also for the design of stabilisation
policy and the models used to analyse it. If changes in the policy rate have little
impact in a recession, policymakers will possibly need to resort to other monetary
policy measures to achieve the desired expansionary effect. The authorities may also
need to rely more heavily on fiscal or financial policies to stabilize the economy in a
deep or protracted slump.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature. Section 3 explains the empirical method and the dataset. Section 4 sets out
the main results and sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes with some thoughts
for future research.
2 Literature
There is a small empirical literature on how the impact of monetary policy varies
with the business cycle. This research has produced mixed results and, perhaps as
a result, the mainstream monetary policy literature, both theoretical and empirical,
has largely ignored the potential for asymmetries and their policy implications. See
for example Christiano et al. (2005), Woodford (2002) and Gali (2008).
The most cited paper in this literature that is perhaps closest to ours in im-
plementation is Weise (1999). Weise (1999) estimates regime-dependency with a
smooth-transition technique (Granger and Terasvirta (1994)), as do we, but applies
this to a VAR rather than a local projection model. The VAR contains industrial
production, consumer prices and the M1, detrended in complicated piecewise fashion
over 1960Q2-1995Q2. Monetary shocks are identified with Choleski orthogonalisa-
tion, putting money last. The regime is indicated by the first lag of quarterly GDP
growth, such that high-frequency shifts in regime are possible. As with other VAR-
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based regime-switching models (and in contrast to the local projection model we
employ), the researcher must decide how to account for the possibility that a shock
causes a shift in regime. In this case, impulse response functions are calculated as
the difference between two stochastic simulations with different initial conditions for
output.
Taken together, the results in this paper are difficult to interpret. In his linear
model, a positive shock to the growth rate of M1 reduces output over a three-year
horizon. The response of output in a high growth regime is similar to the linear
model - i.e. a positive shock to money growth reduces output, whereas the response
in a low-growth regime is almost nonexistent. The price level responds more posi-
tively in booms than in recessions. So the Phillips curve induced by this shock is
approximately vertical in a low-growth regime, and actually negatively sloped in a
high-growth regime.
Garcia (2002) study the response of quarterly industrial production growth to
monetary policy in the US from 1955:2 to 1993:1 . They identify the business cycle
with a two-state Markov switching regime and estimate
∆yt − µ0 − Stµ1 = Σri=1φi (∆yt−i − µ0 − St−iµ1) + βiqXt−i + St−iβipXt−i + t
where Xt is the interest rate in period t and St = 1 if the economy is in an expansion
at time t. They strongly reject the null2 that monetary policy, measured either as
the simple level of Fed Funds rate or as Choleski innovations to a standard three-
variable VAR, is equally powerful in both regimes, in favour of the alternative that
they are more powerful in recessions. This method assumes, among other things,
that the intrinsic persistence of GDP is the same in booms and recessions. If this
assumption is violated in practice, the results will be biased.
Smets and Peersman (2001) study the response of quarterly industrial production
growth to monetary policy in seven Euro-area countries. First, they identify the
business cycle with a two-state Markov switching regime with fixed autoregressive
coefficients but state-dependent means µi,stfor each country i at time t in state s
2i.e.the hypothesis that Σri=1βip = 0 for r = 4
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∆yi,t − µi,st = φ1
(
∆yi,t−1 − µi,st−1
)
+ φ2
(
∆yi,t−2 − µi,st−2
)
+ i,t
They then separately identify monetary policy shocks with a linear VAR and use
the historical contribution to the time-t policy rate in this VAR as the measure of
the shock. They add the first lag of monetary policy shocks (the contribution of
historical shocks to the current interest rate) to the AR(2)
∆yi,t − µi,st = φ1
(
∆yi,t−1 − µi,st−1
)
+ φ2
(
∆yi,t−2 − µi,st−2
)
+ βst−1MPt−1 + i,t
imposing that the state of the economy is the same across the countries in the
sample. They find that β is more negative in recessions than in booms - essentially
the opposite of our finding.
This method imposes strong assumptions on the dynamics of output. Firstly,
that past monetary policy shocks can be aggregated across time in a linear model
when the underlying environment may be nonlinear. Secondly, that the propagation
of a given monetary shock (the φ coefficients) is the same in different regimes; in
other words, all of the difference in the impact of monetary policy is apparent in the
single β coefficient.
Lo and Piger (2005) estimate the following equation
φ (L) yTt = γ0 (L)xt + γ0 (L)xtSt + t
where yTt is the transitory component of log quarterly industrial production, xt is a
monetary policy shock identified from a three-variable structural VAR. St is a two-
state Markov-switching process, in which the probabilities of transition from boom
to recession is function of state variables zt. The authors find that putting a constant
and two lags of an NBER recession date indicator in zt yields very strong evidence
of asymmetry in the response of output to monetary policy. They calculate impulse
response functions to a monetary policy shock in the four possible combinations of
realisations of the state variable {St, St+1} and find that monetary policy is most
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powerful when the economy is in a recession either in period t or t+ 1. Accordingly,
in calculating the impulse response, they do not allow the future state of the economy
to change, either exogenously or in response to a monetary policy shock. Given that
the aim of the exercise is to assess the impact of monetary policy on output - the
state variable - this approach is difficult to defend.
In results, though not in method, our paper is closer to Thoma (1994), who
estimates a non-linear VAR in output and monetary variables, allowing some of the
coefficients to depend linearly on the deviation of output growth from trend. Like us,
he finds that monetary shocks (especially contractionary ones) have more powerful
effects in expansions than recessions. Unlike the approach we follow, however, his
approach requires the researcher to make a number of discretionary decisions on
the econometric specification. Differently from these papers—and importantly for
understanding the transmission menchanism—our paper stresses the difference in
the response during booms of durables and business investment on the one hand and
non-durables on the other, a dimension glossed over in this literature.
Overall the literature has dismissed the empirical and theoretical relevance of
policy asymmetries across the cycle. One notable exception is Vavra (2013), who in
recent work argues that recessions are often characterized by high realized volatility,
and thus frequent price changes, which leads to a steep Phillips curve and ineffective
monetary policy. He estimates a New Keynesian Phillips Curve on US data and
finds support for this hypothesis. Berger and Vavra (2012) simulate a model of
durables expenditure in the presence of adjustment costs and show that durables
purchases are less sensitive to subsidies when output is low. They also show that the
conditional variance of an ARCH process describing durables expenditure is higher
during booms than in recessions, suggesting that either aggregate shocks are larger in
booms, or that durables expenditure is more sensitive to shocks of a given size. They
supply additional evidence against the former possibility, suggesting that durables
expenditure is more sensitive to aggregate shocks - including monetary shocks -
during booms. Our findings, while silent about the specific mechanism, support the
implication of Berger and Vavra (2012)’s model that monetary policy interventions
are more effective during expansions and that most of the effect results from the
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response of durables and business investment.
3 Econometric method
3.1 Specification
Our econometric model closely resembles the smooth transition - local projection
model (STLPM) employed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011). The impulse
response of variable yt at horizon h ∈ {0, H} in state j ∈ {b, r} to a shock εt is
estimated as the coefficient βjh in the following regression
yt+h = τt+
(
αbh + β
b
hεt + γ
b′xt
)
F (zt) + (α
r
h + β
r
hεt + γ
r′xt) (1− F (zt)) + ut
where τ is a linear time trend, αjh is a constant and xt are controls. F (zt) is a
smooth increasing function of an indicator of the state of the economy zt. Following
Granger and Terasvirta (1994) we employ the logistic function
F (zt) =
exp
(
−θ (zt−c)
σz
)
1 + exp
(
−θ (zt−c)
σz
) ,
where c is a parameter that controls what proportion of the sample the economy
spends in either state and σz is the standard deviation of the state variable z. The
parameter θ determines how violently the economy switches from expansion to re-
cession when zt changes.
The local projection model (Jorda` (2005)) has a number of advantages relative
to a VAR. First, it does not impose the dynamic restrictions implicit in a VAR.
Secondly, one can economize on parameters and, in some circumstances, increase
the available degrees of freedom. In particular, one loses H observations from the
need to use up to H leads as dependent variables. But the number of variables on
the right-hand side need only be enough to ensure that the shocks εt are exogenous;
none are needed to describe the dynamics of the endogenous variable conditional on
the shock. If the VAR representation involves a large number of variables and lags,
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the net result will be an increase in the available degrees of freedom. And thirdly, in
a regime-switching setting, one does not need to take a stand on how the economy
switches from one regime to another. The coefficents βjh measure the average effect of
a shock as a function of the state of the economy when the shock hits, and therefore
encompasses the average effect of the shock on the future change in the economy’s
state. In contrast, when using a regime-switching VAR model, the impulse response
of the VAR implicitly assumes no change in the state of the economy, an assumption
that is difficult to defend when we are considering shocks with large real effects.
In this paper, for each variable we estimate the H + 1 equations of the IRF
at horizon 0, ..., H as a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations. By
Kruskal’s theorem, this yields the same point estimates of the regression coefficients
as equation-by-equation OLS, because the explanatory variables are the same in each
equation. But it enables us to calculate the distribution of functions of parameters
at different horizons, such as the smoothed IRFs presented in the figures below.
3.2 Data
We work predominantly with chain-linked US National Accounts data downloaded
from the website of the Philadelphia Fed. Where our aggregates do not correspond
directly with published data, we construct our own approximations to the chain-
linked aggregates with Tornqvist indices (Whelan (2000)). We work with log levels of
volume indices, and log differences of implied deflators. Our monetary policy shocks
εt are quarterly averages of the monetary policy shocks identified by Romer and
Romer (2004), extended through 2008 by Coibion et al. (2012)3. Our sample period
(after the effects of the leads and lags described below are taken into account) runs
from (shocks occurring in) 1969Q1-2003Q2, with the response variables measured up
to five years later. Our sample runs therefore over the four decades leading up to
the collapse of Lehman brothers, but does not include the ensuing major financial
crisis, when the impact of monetary policy could have been different to a ‘normal’
3Using end-quarter data - i.e. the shock in the final month of the quarter - yielded qualitatively
similar results to those below.
8
recession.
3.3 The state variable and the shocks
We follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and define zt as a centred seven-
quarter moving average of real quarterly GDP growth, and a recession as the worst
20 per cent of the periods in our sample, setting c to make this so. Higher values of γ
mean that F (zt) spends more time close to the {0, 1} bounds of the process, moving
the model closer to a discrete regime-switching setup. Smaller values of γ mean that
more of the observations are taken to contain some information about behaviour in
both regimes. We set γ = 3 to give an intermediate degree of intensity to the regime
switching. Chart 1 shows our transformed state variable F (zt) at these parameter
values alongside the time series of the Romer monetary policy shocks. The figure
shows, inter alia, that the monetary policy shocks associated with the early part of
Paul Volcker’s Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve - the period of greatest variability
in the shocks - took place on the whole at a time of relatively weak economic activity.
Appendix A examines the robustness of our findings to alternative choices of γ (the
intensity of regime-switching), c (the proportion of the sample we call a recession),
the length and phase-shift of the moving average state variable, and the identification
scheme of the monetary policy shocks.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
The first four columns of Figure 2 show the smoothed impulse response of the vol-
ume of GDP, the inflation rate of the GDP deflator and the Federal Funds rate to
an identified monetary-policy shock that generates an initial 1pp rise in the Federal
Funds Rate - i.e. h is on the x-axis, βh is on the y-axis. The first column displays
the central estimate of the impulse response in expansions (dashed lines), recessions
(dotted lines) and a linear model (solid lines, where we restrict the coefficient to be
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constant across regimes). The second to fourth columns display central tendencies
and 90% confidence intervals for the linear model, expansions and recessions respec-
tively. The solid lines in the fifth column displays the t-statistic of the null hypothesis
that
(
βbh − βrh
)
, with dotted lines at ±1.65. So, for example, if the solid line in the
fourth columns falls below the lower dotted line at some horizon h we can reject the
null that the IRFs at that horizon are equal in favour of the alternative that they
are more negative in expansions at a 5% significance level. The IRFs are scaled so
that the shock results in a 1pp increase in the Fed Funds rate in all three regimes.
Figure 2 shows that the linear model delivers a familiar picture. Following a
contractionary monetary policy shock, the level of output starts to fall, reaching a
minimum of about half a percentage point below baseline two to three years after
the shock, before beginning to recover. Inflation is initially sticky, but eventually
falls by up to half a percentage point (at an annualised rate), and then begins to
recover by the end of the horizon. The policy rate is persistent but reverts towards
and eventually passes through the conditional mean.
The difference between expansions and recessions is seen most clearly in the left-
hand column. Output responds almost an order of magnitude more strongly in an
expansion than in a recession, with the maximum fall about 2% rather than 0.3%.
Inflation also falls much more sharply. In a recession, the peak responses of output
and inflation are statistically insignificantly different from zero, and the inflation
response is more likely to be positive than negative. In an expansion, the nominal
policy rate falls sharply below the conditional mean about two years after the shock,
whereas it remains above it in a recession. It is therefore clear from the figures that
the larger response of nominal and real variables in an expansion is not attributable
to a bigger rise in real interest rates.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the impulse response of the volumes and prices of three
expenditure aggregates to the same shock as before. Figure 3 shows that, in line
with the response of aggregate output, all the volume indices respond much more
in an expansion than in a recession. The top and bottom rows - indices of durable
household and business expenditure - respond roughly an order of magnitude more
than nondurable consumption, both in an expansion (7% vs 1%) and in the linear
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model (2.5% vs 0.3%). In a recession, the response of all three kinds of expenditure
is insignificant.
Figure 4 shows that the response of prices is also larger in an expansion. In
an expansion, durables prices fall by more than nondurables, but the gap is much
smaller than the gap in the responses of expenditure. This suggests that there is
some substitutability of inputs between the two sectors, such that a contraction in
one lowers cost pressures in both. Once again, the response of inflation in a recession
is insignificant.
Figure 5 plots the impulse response of four other variables often implicated in
the transmission of monetary policy shocks. The first two rows show the response of
real government consumption and net tax revenues (as a share of GDP) respectively.
If fiscal policy responds systematically to monetary policy, and this response differs
systematically across the business cycle, then this could account for the difference in
the response of output across the cycle. However, there is little support for this in
the data. Government consumption does not respond significantly to the shock in
either regime. If anything, it appears to be counteracting monetary policy more in
an expansion than in an recession. Taxes appear to be supporting policy more in a
recession. So a difference in fiscal policy does not appear to explain the main results.
The third row shows a measure of the external finance premium - the Gilchrist-
Zakrajsek bond spread (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)). Monetary policy could
be more powerful in a boom if the external finance premium is more increasing in
interest rates in good times than in bad, such that the rates at which households and
firms can borrow move by more than the policy rate suggests. However, the opposite
appears to be the case: the external finance premium counteracts the effect of a
monetary shock in an expansion. In a recession, the premium amplifies the shock.
The difference in the response - which would tend to generate an opposite result to
the one we find for the impact of monetary policy on expenditure and prices - is
not quite significant at standard levels. So the response of financing spreads cannot
explain why policy is more powerful in a boom.
The fourth row shows the response of the ratio of non-financial private debt to
GDP to a policy tightening. Once again, the response appears to more negative
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in an expansion than in a recession, although the significance of the estimate is
marginal. There is accordingly no strong evidence that a greater non-price response
of credit quantities in an expansion can explain the stronger response of the economy
in expansions; if anything, the reverse is apparent in the data.
4.2 The distribution of shocks in expansions and recessions
One possible explanation for these findings is that the response of the economy to
monetary policy shocks is indeed nonlinear, but is not directly a function of the
state of the economy. Rather, it is possible that policy shocks of different kinds are
more common at certain times, and it is this that generates the apparent dependence
of the IRF on the state of the business cycle. If, say, large or positive shocks are
proportionally more powerful than small or negative shocks, and if they are more
common in expansions than recessions, then an empirical model like ours that is
linear in the shocks, conditional on the regime, would misleadingly uncover a larger
IRF in expansions than in recessions.
Figure 6 shows IRFs for state-independent model modified such that positive and
negative shocks are allowed to have different effects. We plot
{
β+h , β
−
h
}
, h ∈ {0, H}
estimated from the following equation
yt+h = τt+ α
b
h + β
+
h max [0, εt] + β
−
h min [0, εt] + γ
b′xt + ut
and again scale β so that the shock raises the policy rate by 1 percentage point on
impact. The figure shows that positive Romer shocks have a much larger impact on
output than negative Romer shocks. Their effects on inflation are much more similar,
with the difference between them not significant at standard levels. The bottom row
shows that positive shocks are substantially more persistent than negative shocks,
hampering any reliable inferences about the effect of a given interest rate. However,
the finding that positive shocks (monetary tightenings) appear to have a bigger
impact on output, but not necessarily on inflation, than negative shocks may be
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interesting in its own right.4
If positive shocks to the federal funds rate were more common in expansions than
recessions, the results in Figure 6 might account for the finding that policy tends
to be more powerful in expansions than recessions. But no such regime-dependent
pattern in the shocks exists. Figure 7 shows estimates of the pdf and the cdf of the
shocks overall and depending on the state of the business cycle.5 There is almost no
difference between the central tendencies of the distributions of shocks in booms and
recessions - positive shocks do not preponderate in booms.
The main difference between the two regimes apparent in Figure 7 is that there is
more mass in the tails of the shock distribution during recessions. If smaller shocks,
which are more common in booms, are proportionally more powerful, this could also
explain our finding of a larger average impact of shocks. To check this we estimated
the following equation
yt+h = τt+ α
b
h + β
s
hεt + β
l
hε
3
t + γ
b′xt + ut
i.e. adding the cubed value of the Romer shock as an additional explanatory variable.
If the coefficent βlh on this variable were significantly positive (negative), this would
count as evidence that large shocks of either sign are more (less) powerful. Figure
8 plots the t-statistics associated with the null hypothesis that βlh = 0 for each of
the variables featured above. There is some evidence that larger shocks are more
persistent (a t-statistic close to +2), but no consistent evidence that this translates
into a different effect on output or inflation. If anything, the positive t-statistic in
the inflation panel suggests that bigger shocks have proportionally more powerful
effects on inflation. Given that big shocks are more common in recessions but policy
4We estimated another equation in which the impact of policy was allowed depend both on the
sign of the shock and on the state of the economy when it hit - i.e. to take on four values at any
given horizon. We did not find any consistent statistically significant evidence of non-linearities by
the sign of the shock, but the precision of our estimates was low given the loss of degrees of freedom
inherent in this procedure.
5The linear estimate is the raw Romer shocks smoothed with a normally distributed kernel. The
expansion and recession estimates are generated by weighting the kernel function with the F (zt)
and 1− F (zt) respectively.
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is more powerful in expansions, this would lend weight to the idea that a given policy
shock is intrinsically more powerful in a boom than in a recession.
In summary, positive shocks appear to be more powerful than negative shocks, but
they are not more common in expansions than recessions. Larger shocks are more
common in recessions than expansions, but the effect of a shock does not clearly
depend more or less than proportionally on its size. This suggests that differences
across regimes in the distribution of the shocks, as opposed to differences across
regimes in the response to a given shock, do not explain our key findings.
5 Concluding remarks
We have found statistically strong evidence that standard measures of US monetary
policy shocks have had more powerful effects on expenditure quantities and prices
during economic expansions than during recessions. Moreover, we find that virtually
all of the response of activity during booms is due to the response of durables and
business investment. These findings are robust to several variations in the empirical
model. They do not appear to be an artefact of different patterns in the shocks
themselves, and therefore must be due to differences in how a given shock affects the
economy at different points in the business cycle.
The findings question the common wisdom that cuts in policy rates can stop
or mitigate recessions, calling for the analysis of alternative policy measures during
contractions. On the modelling side, the findings call for monetary models that
generate a higher sensitivity in the response of durable goods during expansions, an
asymmetry that has been largely glossed over by the theoretical literature.6
A Appendix: sensitivity analysis
The following appendix examines the robustness of our findings to alternative choices
of γ (the intensity of regime-switching), c (the proportion of the sample we call a
6As noted, a recent exception is Berger and Vavra (2012),.who propose a promising and plausible
mechanism that could account for our empirical findings.
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recession), the state variable zt, and source of monetary policy shocks t. The bottom
line is that our qualitative results are robust to reasonable alternatives along each of
these margins.
A.1 Intensity of regime switching (γ)
Figures 9 and 10 are analogues of figure 2 but where we have set γ equal to 1 and
10 respectively. They show that the qualitative message of the earlier analysis is
unchanged.
A.2 Proportion of sample in a recession (c)
Figure 11 shows that the main qualitative conclusions are robust to increasing to
50% the proportion of the sample judged to be more in a recession than in a boom.
A.3 State variable
Figure 12 shows the baseline IRFs calculated when zt is a lagging rather than centred
moving average of output. The gap between booms and recessions shrinks, and
become statistically less significant, but the broad picture remains.
A.4 Policy shocks
Figure 13 shows the baseline IRFs calculated when t are the structural shocks recov-
ered from a VAR in the log-levels of GDP, the GDP deflator and the Federal Funds
rate, with a Choleski identification scheme in which monetary policy is ordered last.
The message from the figures is very similar to our baseline case.
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Figure 2: Impulse response of headline variables to a monetary policy shock
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Figure 3: Impulse response of expenditure volumes
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Figure 4: Impulse response of expenditure prices
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions of fiscal and credit variables
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Figure 6: Impulse response to positive and negative monetary policy shocks
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Figure 7: Pdfs and cdfs of the regime-specific shocks
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Figure 8: t statistics on cubed monetary policy shocks
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Figure 9: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy shock, γ = 1
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Figure 10: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy shock, γ = 10
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Figure 11: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy shock, c = 50
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Figure 12: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy shock, zt lagging
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Figure 13: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy shocks identified
with a VAR
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